Few questions test a plural society more than how we respond to the threat of hatred without surrendering freedom. In polarised times it is tempting to set these two values against each other: to assume that protecting some people from hostility must narrow everyone else's liberty, or that defending free speech means tolerating abuse. But this is a false choice.
The new government definition of anti-Muslim hostility shows a better balance is possible. It is a welcome step, recognising the hostility faced by Muslims and those perceived to be Muslims, while explicitly protecting the freedom to criticise, question, satirise, and reject religious ideas.
Humanists have always argued for both halves of that sentence: people must be protected from harm and discrimination, but our ideas must remain open to scrutiny. Human rights protect human beings, not religions, doctrines, or dogmas. A Muslim, like everyone else, has an equal right to dignity, safety, and opportunity; and every belief, humanist beliefs included, must remain open to challenge.
That is why we welcome "anti-Muslim hostility" over the more ambiguous "Islamophobia," which too often blurs the line between prejudice against people and criticism of beliefs. Authoritarian states invoke offence to religion to silence dissidents, minorities, women, LGBT people, and the non-religious and blasphemy laws are always about social control. We repealed ours in England and Wales in 2008 and in Scotland in 2024, and we cannot let them return through the back door.
Nor can we be complacent about the hostility Muslims face: abuse, harassment, intimidation, online hatred, and unlawful discrimination. These actions corrode trust and shape where people feel safe and how they are treated at work or school.
A real strength of the definition is that it names the target as people, as Muslims and those perceived to be Muslims — not Islam itself. That distinction matters enormously to the former Muslims we support through our Faith to Faithless programme, who often pay a heavy price for exercising their freedom of conscience: ostracism, threats, family breakdown, and fear. Many reject Islamic beliefs while standing firmly against prejudice towards Muslims; some are themselves the target of that approach.
The three-limbed structure of the definition helps too, separating criminal acts, stereotyping meant to stir up hatred, and unlawful discrimination. A hateful stereotype spread to provoke hostility is not the same as a public-interest debate about doctrine, secularism, gender equality, or sex education. Good policy depends on telling them apart.
The explanatory note makes plain that criticism of religion, including Islam, is protected, as are critical histories of religious practice, ridicule that believers may find disrespectful, and academic and political debate. These are not concessions to humanists or secularists; they protect everyone: reformers within religious traditions, women challenging patriarchal readings of faith, LGBT+ Muslims, and dissenting voices of every kind.
Implementation will need care. Applied lazily or fearfully, any definition can be misused, so public bodies, universities, and employers must grasp that it changes no law, creates no right not to be offended, and must never shut down robust debate.
And we would have preferred a framework that treats hostility based on any religion or belief consistently, religious or not; the principle should always be equal dignity, not communal hierarchy. But we should not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.
That is the spirit in which this definition should be read and applied: not as a shield for religion from scrutiny, but as a tool to protect people from hostility; not as a privilege for one community, but as part of building a society where everyone can live freely and equally. One definition will not end anti-Muslim hostility. But at a time of rising tension and misinformation, clearer language helps. It lets us say, without contradiction, that promoting hatred of Muslims is unacceptable in a fair and equal society and that religious ideas and practices must always remain open to criticism in a free one.
